Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar

Here is an insightful analysis by Farhi. She is trying hard to explain why Jafari would acknowledge revolutionary gourd's role in the stealing of the election by Ahmadinejad camp. Against her own title, the suggestion of Jafari as stupid, she resists all such characterization to settle on subtle seasonings behind Jafari's admissions. To the list of reasons she offers, I would like to add: he thinks people are stupid; people like him are no fan of subtlety; he is incompetent; he is arrogant because he thinks they can get away with everything. One could have stolen the election with a little more finesse as to avoid this mess. It is a smart analysis nevertheless. Here it is:

http://icga.blogspot.com/2009/09/is-commander-jafari-stupid.html
Is Commander Jafari Stupid?
Farideh Farhi

Tehran is buzzing about a speech by Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander of Islamic Revolution's Guard Corps (IRGC) that was made public on September 2 by Fars News, a hard-line news agency. It was delivered in front of some of the early military leaders of the Iran-Iraq War and elicited immediate sharp responses.It is noteworthy for several reasons.First and foremost was Jafari's open acknowledgment that at least since February 2009, well before the June election, the IRGC was closely monitoring the reformists of all hue in order to keep in check their presumed efforts to weaken or undermine the office of the leader (rahbari) Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.This acknowledgment came in reference to an attribution of a statement to the former president Mohammad Khatami, which according to Jafari was uttered in February 2009. Jafari did not reveal how this statement was accessed. Setting aside the real possibility of distortions, a wiretap should probably be considered a good bet.According to Jafari, Khatami said, "If in this election Ahmadinejad falls, then rahbari will be effectively eliminated; if at any cost reforms return to the executive branch, rahbari will have no authority in society. through the defeat of principlists, we must contain the power of rahbari."Indeed, in Jafari's telling, the IRGC had to enter the fray well before the election took place in order to prevent the weakening or even elimination of rahbari. It did this by taking note of what the reformists were doing and identifying them as enemies of the Islamic state as embodied in rahbari.This is an astounding public admission by the commander of a body that is presumably supposed to stay out of partisan politics. Of course, Jafari's likely riposte is that Article 150 of Iran's constitution gives the IRGC the responsibility of "guarding the revolution and its achievements." Hence by identifying key reformist leaders as enemies of rahbari, the commander offers justification for taking sides in the election and even more so for manipulating the election.If Jafari is be taken at his words, even if in the official narrative the election had been won by Mir Hossein Mussavi, then IRGC would have had no choice but to enter the fray and overturn the results since such a victory would have brought to power people who wanted to undermine the Islamic Republic.Considering that in the minds of many Iranians doubtful of election results, this is precisely what the IRGC did, such an admission was probably imprudent if not outright stupid.But at this point Jafari is probably less concerned about the doubts of the Iranian population and more interested in justifying the intrusive role the body he heads has taken in Iranian politics, particularly to many members of the Iranian elites who are fence sitters as neither full-fledged reformists nor comfortable conservatives with the increasing role of military in politics.Jafari's second admission - and this one quite explicit - was that in his mind, there is really no difference between a change in the policy direction of the country - change of behavior he called it - and regime change. Again this is a significant admission since important policy differences in both domestic and foreign arenas have generally been accepted in the Islamic Republic.The distinction made is between a barandaz - someone who wants to overthrow the regime - and a critic. The equation of behavior or policy change with regime change and the argument that policy differences now amount to the challenges to the foundations of the Islamic Republic, transforming the Islamic Republic's revolutionary character along the lines designed by the country's external enemies, is a clear admission that differences about how the country should conduct itself is at the core of the current crisis.Individuals are called traitors not because they have done anything illegal, but because they think differently about policies.Again this is an astounding admission in the midst of major trials of some of the reformist leaders. From Jafari's point of view, they should be prosecuted and convicted not because they broke laws but because through an electoral process they wanted to change the policy direction of the country.Jafari's third admission came in the form of reporting on the previously unreported prison confessions of two key reformist leaders - Mohammad Ali Abtahi and Mohammad Atrianfar, effectively acknowledging IRGC's access to prisoners that have been kept in the Intelligence Ministry's Ward 209 at Evin Prison.Again, probably not a smart move to openly acknowledge the IRGC's role in the imprisonment and interrogation of prisoners. As the violent crackdown has unfolded since the election, there has been a lot of talk about the unknown sources of violence dished out to the population. In effect no one has wanted to take responsibility and unidentified "rogue elements" or "plain-clothes men" have been the usual suspects.Jafari's speech has now made it much easier for people to pin institutional responsibility and blame for the post-election gratuitous violence, indiscriminate arrests, deaths, tortures (of white and physical kind), and forced confessions.The question is, even if IRGC was indeed the leading force in making sure the reformists did not win and also the headquarter of the post-election crackdown, why would Jafari decide to acknowledge this openly, eliciting immediate reactions from reformist leaders and organizations accusing him of not only improper institutional conduct but also slander?The leader of the reformist faction in the Parliament, Mohammadreza Tabesh, went as far as to suggest that "those who have given license to Sepah's [IRGC's] entry into elections and interrogations should be prosecuted and not those whose background and responsibilities chronicle their attachment to the system, rahbari and the deceased Imam." The Association of Combatant Clergy, whose two leading members Khatami and Mohammad Mussavi Khoeiniha were accused by Jafari of plotting against rahbari, in turn asked the new prosecutor general to do something about the type of slander that is being thrown around. Presidential candidate Mehdi Karrubi firmly suggested to Jafari to go back to the barracks.It is difficult to decipher the reasons for Jafari's public admissions. It is possible that his frank talk marks the beginning of a move against high ranking former leaders of the Islamic Republic. By making the transition from accusing the reformists of "doubting" the election results - which no where is stated to be a crime in Iran - to one of an attempted effort to undermine rahbari - which is considered a crime, Jafari may be setting the stage for a much bigger purge of reformist leaders than the one already in progress and put together by the now replaced Prosecutor General of Tehran, Saeed Mortazavi.Another possibility is that Jafari's talk is about justifying IRGC's actions in the face of the reality that the trials and forced confessions have so far not revealed any committed crimes.To be sure, individual prisoners have acknowledged their mistake in doubting the election results, lamented the influence of foreign ideas and concepts on university curricula, talked about the pernicious role of the foreign press in highlighting divisions inside Iran, and deliberated in length on external designs to sow dissent inside Iran.But none of the defendants have confessed to a serious crime. In their confessions, some have accused others not present in the courtroom and roaming free of financial misbehavior in the election and desire to win by all means. But no concrete evidence has been offered. In other words they have "confessed" to crimes committed by other people, which in no body of laws, including Iranian and Islamic laws, is considered sufficient for prosecution; just accusations hurled against others that cannot be accepted as fact and used in public the way Jafari has done without corroborating evidence..Beyond justification, Jafari's words may also be about intimidation. Threatening Khatami, Mussavi and Mussavi Khoeiniha - a cleric who was ironically the so-called spiritual leader of US embassy hostage takers and today many hardliners consider to be the eminence grise of the reform movement - with treason may be a way to try to silence the outcry and change the national conversation from a focus on the responsibility for the people killed by the security forces - latest confirmed figures are 72 according to a key Mussavi advisor - and crimes of rape and savage beatings that have taken place in various prisons against young men and women who were simply exercising their constitutionally protected rights to peaceful protest.Unfortunately for Jafari, though, none of the people he may be trying to intimidate is showing any sign of backing down. Karrubi's dogged efforts to find the sources of violence have finally led to the creation of a three-member committee to investigate the crimes in the Judiciary. Khatami and the reformist clerical organization to which he belongs also keep challenging the kind of narrative put out by Jafari and the same is true of Mussavi.The only way to silence them is to incarcerate them on charges of sedition against rahbari; a move that simply cannot take place without the assent of the commander-in-chief or Khamenei himself.The issue is not whether Jafari would like the arrests to happen. His speech clearly suggests he does. The intriguing question is why he is talking about all this publicly, in effect pleading or calling for the arrests?Why doesn't he, like all good military men intent on maintaining the status quo, simply work behind the scene to arrange for arrests and silencing without implicating himself and the IRGC in such a public manner? Why the urge to speak?The answer to this key question in all likelihood is found in the felt need to defend the indefensible in front of a crowd of old Iran-Iraq War commanders who remain highly skeptical of IRGCs politicization and its use as an instrument of repression against Iranian citizens in the name of saving the Islamic republic and its leader.If so, this was not a speech given from a position of strength.

my blog is going to eat my homework

I am starting a blog that I hope will provide insightful reflections on Iran. There is a lot that is being said about Iran. Most of it by people who do not speak Persian, never been to Iran, never been to a Friday prayer, never listen to a sermon for any occasion, never been confronted by Basijis or revolutionary guard members,... you get the picture.

I will have to see how much of my time will be chewed by this new project. I am hoping for the best.

For a starter: a number of clergy (mid ranking, so far) has started to warn against further militarization of politics in Iran (better late than never). The revolutionary guard has become aggressively involved in politics. A fundamentalist member of Parliament (yes, not a reformist)warned against this trend. Recent events are pushing the silent majority of ayatollahs and clerical class into a more active role in politics to push back against absolute dictatorship in the name of religion (velayat faqih)... Are we in for a self-correction?

More later...
Payam Azaad